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Abstract
The privatization of a natural resource is often proposed as a solu-
tion to the degradation of natural resources under open access, known
as the Tragedy of the Commons. However, this e¢ ciency improve-
ment may come at a distributional cost (Weitzman, 1974) as tradi-
tional users of the resource lose income and employment unless they
are given a large enough share of the property rights.The present pa-
per demonstrates that, in the case of renewable resources, traditional
users may gain from privatization even if they are denied ownership
of the resource. Indeed, a private owner maximizes pro￿ts by preserv-
ing the resource, which results in long-term increases in employment.
Hence, the short term losses to traditional users from lower labor de-
mand and loss of rent, must be weighted against the long term gains
from employment creation. We also derive the conditions under which
privatization is Pareto-improving, bene￿ting both the new and tradi-
tional owners of the natural resource.
Keywords: Renewable resources, Common access; Privatization;
Employment creation
JEL-codes: O13; Q23; Q28
1 Introduction
Common access to natural resources, like ￿sh, pastures and trees, is wide-
spread in developing economies and often characterized by excessive exploita-
tion of the resource (see for instance Baland and Platteau, 1996). Motivated
1by ￿scal and environmental concerns, governments seek to restrict access to
the commons. This is typically done by privatizing, that is by de￿ning and
enforcing exclusive property rights over the resources.
From an e¢ ciency point of view, restricting access to the commons is
typically the right thing to do. It is well known that open access may lead to a
￿tragedy of the commons￿ , characterized by economic loss and environmental
degradation. With well de￿ned property rights, pro￿t maximizing behavior
leads to the conservation of the resource and thereby improves economic
e¢ ciency. However, while privatization of the commons may bene￿t the
economy as a whole, such a transfer of control rights has been shown to
necessarily harm labor. Samuelson (1974) and Weitzman (1974) demonstrate
that, in the absence of redistribution, workers are always better o⁄ with
(ine¢ cient) free-access rights than under (e¢ cient) private ownership. This
is because privatization restricts the use of a resource, and thereby reduces
labor demand and labor incomes. In the words of Weitzman (1974, 234)
￿....there may be a good reason for propertyless variable factor units to be
against e¢ ciency improving moves toward marginalism like the introduction
of property rights or tolls unless they get a speci￿c kickback in one form
or another.￿It is also clear that traditional users bene￿t from privatization
if they are given property rights over the resource (see e.g. Roemer and
Sylvestre, 1995).
In this paper, we demonstrate that, in the context of renewable resources,
privatization necessarily leads to a long-run job creation e⁄ect, which is pos-
itive for labor. This e⁄ect is based on the conservation e⁄orts by the new
owner, which leads to a larger future stock of the resource. Conservation
thereby implies a short term reduction but a long term increase in labor
demand. With the growth of the resource, the long run e⁄ect dominates,
leading to a net increase in the total demand for labor. As a result, even if
traditional users are denied property rights and all the rents are captured by
an outsider, they will enjoy an increase in their labor incomes. This increase
may be large enough for privatization to be Pareto-improving, even in the
absence of redistribution.
By focussing on a static framework, the literature so far has not consid-
ered the dynamic impact of privatization in the case of renewable resources,
and has thereby ignored its long run conservation properties. A number
of contributions, however, extend or revisit the results given by Weitzman,
keeping with the traditional, static approach of the commons. For instance,
de Meza and Gould (1985) show that when the commons consist of di⁄er-
2ent resources, privatization can increase employment on some of them, even
though total employment must fall. In another paper, de Meza and Gould
(1987) demonstrate that, if multiple inputs are simultaneously used on the
commons, the welfare of traditional users may go up. For example, a well-
managed pasture may increase the value of the cattle so much that cattle
owners bene￿t from the privatization of the commons, even though they lost
their free access to it. In a similar vein, Brito et al (1997) investigate the
case where labor supplied to the resource is not uniformly productive, and
show that, under some conditions, labor returns may again rise. Finally,
Baland and Francois (2005) show that the commons may e⁄ectively protect
poor people against adverse income shocks, a property which may be hard to
replicate with a privatized resource in the presence of information problems.
To illustrate the potential bene￿ts of restricted access, consider the case
of the island of Hispaniola (Diamond, 2005). The two countries that share
this island, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, have experienced radical dif-
ferences in both economic and ecological performance. Despite the geograph-
ical and historical similarity between the two countries, per capita income
is ￿ve times higher in the Dominican Republic than in Haiti. Ecologically,
there are also sharp di⁄erences, with 28% of the Dominican Republic being
forested, compared to only 1% in Haiti. Moreover, the remaining forests of
Haiti are continuously being threatened by peasants felling trees for charcoal
production.
In Haiti, weak formal institutions and short-sighted policies have led to
a de facto open access to the forests, resulting in a tragedy of the commons.
In contrast, the Dominican Republic has had for a long time a top-down ap-
proach to environmental management, launched under the Trujillo era (1930-
61). Trujillo took control over the forests and was personally involved in the
forest industry. In the process, he expanded national parks and enforced
forest protection, curbing wasteful practices of indiscriminate logging and
burning, and prohibiting people from free access to forests. In the long run,
this policy has arguably contributed to higher income levels in the population
and a sounder ecology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, starting
with the commons solution and then moving on to the privatized arrange-
ment. Section 3 contains the analysis, comparing labor and total income
under the two solutions. Section 4 concludes.
32 The model
Consider an economy consisting of a rural and an urban sector. Production
in the rural sector combines labor and a natural resource. We refer to the
latter as a forest, with the trees used for charcoal production. The alternative
to logging is employment in the city. The price of ￿nal goods in both sectors
is normalized to unity. In each period t, total labor endowment is unity,
allocated between the rural sector (lrt) and the urban sector (lut):
lrt + lut = 1: (1)
Each rural worker works on the commons and cuts one unit of trees. His
marginal productivity is equal to 1 if the number of rural workers does not
exceed the existing stock of trees, l￿
rt: Otherwize, the marginal productivity
of additional rural workers falls to zero. Workers in the city receive a wage
equal to the value of their marginal product, i.e., wt = MPut. The marginal
product of labor in the city is:
wt = MPut = 1 ￿ lut = lrt: (2)
There are two periods, and we abstract from discounting. In period 1,
the endowment of trees is given by l￿
r1. The number of trees in period 2 is
determined by the number of trees left in the forest in period 1, (l￿
r1 ￿ lr1),





r1 ￿ lr1)(1 + g): (3)
We focus on the case where the natural resource is scarce, in the sense that,
with maximum harvesting in period 1 (lr1 = 1), there is a not enough of the
resource left in period 2 to provide full employment in that sector: lr2 < 1.
This can be expressed as:
(l
￿






which we assume to hold. We ￿rst analyze resource allocation and labor
income prevailing under common access before turning to the situation under
private property.
42.1 Common access
There are di⁄erent sources of ine¢ ciency on the commons. Following Hardin
(1968), Weitzman (1974) focused on a static ine¢ ciency, resulting from
crowding externalities in the use of the common resource. In the basic version
of our model, we abstract from this static ine¢ ciency and assume that work-
ers exploit the resource as long as their marginal productivity is greater or
equal to their alternative occuption. (We discuss further this assumption in
Section 3.3.) We focus instead on the dynamic externality: traditional users
do not internalize the impact of their harvesting decisions on the future stock
of the resource. As a result, open access typically leads to overexploitation
of the resource in the ￿rst period, leaving little or nothing to harvest in the
second period, thereby lowering long-term employment opportunities in this
sector.
We ￿rst consider the case where the resource is relatively scarce and can
be fully depleted in the ￿rst period, before turning to the case where it is
abundant.
2.1.1 Case 1. Relative scarcity of resource
Consider a situation in which the initial resource endowment is small, l￿
r1 ￿
1. The number of loggers is then equal to lr1 = l￿
r1, leading to complete
deforestation in the ￿rst period. The stock of the resource is nil in the
second period. In the ￿rst period, the remaining workers, 1￿l￿
r1, work in the
city and earn a wage equal to l￿
r1, which is lower than the income earned on











Note that the ￿rst term in this expression can be de￿ned as the total wage
bill, and the second term as the rents enjoyed by the users of the resource.
Since there are no trees in period 2, lu2 = 1: wages and income are nil in
period 2.
2.1.2 Case 2. Relative abundance of resource
Consider the situation where l￿
r1 > 1. All workers are involved in logging
in period 1. However, due to the abundance of the resource, there are still
5trees left in period 2. The number of trees in period 2, and hence the num-
ber of workers involved in logging in that period, is given by lr2 = l￿
r2 =
(l￿
r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g). Wages in period 2 are given by:




r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g): (6)
Total income in this case is given by:
I
2
C = 1 + (l
￿
r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g) + [1 ￿ (l
￿
r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g)](l
￿
r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g): (7)
The ￿rst term of I2
C is the ￿rst period income, which is equal to 1. The
second term represents wages and the third term, resource rents in period 2.
2.2 Private ownership
Under private ownership, pro￿t maximization leads to the e¢ cient solution.
Without loss of generality, we refer here to a situation where exclusive prop-
erty rights over the resource have been given to a single owner. His pro￿ts
are given by:
￿ = (1 ￿ w1)lr1 + (1 ￿ w2)(l
￿
r1 ￿ lr1)(1 + g): (8)
The private owner perfectly internalizes the dynamic externality and fully
realizes that his restricting logging in period 1 allows for larger harvests in
the second period. The optimal choice combines this conservation incentive
with cost minimization, which depends on the wage rates prevailing in each
period.
Assuming an interior solution, maximizing pro￿t with respect to lr1 yields:
1 ￿ w1 = (1 ￿ w2)(1 + g): (9)
Since w1 = lr1 and w2 = lr2 = (1 + g)(l￿
r1 ￿ lr1), we can rewrite (9) as:
1 ￿ lr1 = (1 ￿ (1 + g)(l
￿
r1 ￿ lr1))(1 + g): (10)
If growth is su¢ ciently strong, pro￿t maximization involves a corner solution
with full conservation in period 1. We ￿nd that:





2 ￿ l0: (11)
6For l￿
r1 ￿ l0, the optimal solution leads to lr1 = 0. From (10), the equilibrium
number workers employed in logging in period 1 is given by:
lr1 =
l￿
r1 (1 + g)
2 ￿ g




lr1 = 0 if l
￿
r1 ￿ l0: (12)
Given the natural growth of the resource, a pro￿t maximizing agent chooses
in period 1 to extract a smaller share of the resource than under the commons.
Typically, a pro￿t maximizing agent never depletes the resource in the ￿rst
period, and the stronger is the growth of the resource, the more is preserved
for future extraction. Total labor income when resources are privatized are
given by IP = lr1 + (1 + g)(l￿
r1 ￿ lr1), where the ￿rst term is ￿rst period
labor income and the second term is second period labor income. Using (12),





r1 (1 + g)(2 + g) + g2
1 + (1 + g)
2 if l
￿
r1 > l0; (13)
I
2




r1 ￿ l0: (14)
3 The Analysis
3.1 The e⁄ect of privatization on employment and wages
We start the analysis of the model by emphasizing the e⁄ect of privatization
on employment and wages. We ￿nd that:
Proposition 1 If g > 0; second period and total employment in the resource
extracting sector is larger under private ownership than under common ac-
cess.
Proof. Under common access, period 1 resource extraction is only con-
strained by the availability of labor. Given l￿
r1 < l4 in (4), we know that
lr1 > lr2 under common access. In contrast, under private property, g > 0 )
lr1 < lr2. This follows directly from (10). Hence, second period employ-
ment is larger under private ownership than under common access. Re-
garding total employment in the resource extracting sector, we know that
7lr1 + lr2 = lr1 + (1 + g)(l￿
r1 ￿ lr1) = l￿
r1 (1 + g) ￿ glr1. Since lr1 is higher un-
der common access than private ownership, it follows that with g > 0, total
employment is higher under private ownership.
Regarding wages, we can conclude that:
Proposition 2 Second period wages and total wages over time are higher
under private ownership than under common access.
Proof. The wage level is a function of employment in the resource ex-
tracting sector, more precisely wt = lrt. The proof of Proposition 2 then
follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1.
In order to determine whether or not privatization is Pareto-improving,
the gains in employment and wages to labor must be weighed against the
loss by traditional users of their resource rents. In what follows, we analyze
more closely this tradeo⁄.
3.2 When is privatization Pareto-improving?
We now compare labor income in the privatized solution with total income in
the commons solution. We ￿rst analyze the case of a scarce resource (l￿
r1 ￿ 1)
and of an interior solution under private property (l￿
r1 > l0). The critical level
of l￿
r1 for which the two arrangements yield the same level of income to the








2 + g (1 + g) ￿
q
4(1 + g) ￿ 3g2 (1 + g)
2
2 + 2(1 + g)
2 ￿ l1: (15)
When there is a corner solution under private ownership (i.e., for l ￿ l0) ,







r1 = 1 ￿ g ￿ l2: (16)
Finally, we compare incomes when the resource is abundant ( l￿
r1 > 1).








(1 + g)(2 + g)
1 + (1 + g)
2 ￿ l3: (17)
We have also de￿ned above l0 as the critical level of resource endowment
below which the pro￿t maximizer chooses not to harvest in the ￿rst period,
8and l4 as the critical initial endowment above which there is no scarcity
of trees under open access in both period. Figure 1 illustrates the critical
levels of initial resource endowment as a function of the biological growth
rate and indicates which regime gives the higher income to the users, with
￿P￿ indicating that private ownership dominates, and ￿C￿ that common
access dominates. Privatization is necessarily Pareto-improving when private
ownership dominates common access, even though traditional users are not
directly compensated for the loss of their rights.
g
















Figure 1: Common access vs Private property
Interpreting the ￿gure, it is useful to start with g = 0. We observe
that, in this case, workers never bene￿t from privatization. This is in line
with the classical result by Weitzman (1974) discussed in the introduction.
There is, however, one level of l￿
r1 for which workers are indi⁄erent between
private ownership and common access; which is l￿
r1 = 1. At this point,
the distortion under common access is at its maximal level, with full rent
dissipation. The loss in revenue today is then exactly balanced by increased
9revenues in the future. At l￿
r1 = 1, any positive growth rate naturally makes
private ownership the preferred regime for labor. Hence, for l￿
r1 = 1 and
g > 0, privatization is necessarily Pareto-improving. The range of initial
endowments for which private ownership is Pareto-superior to common access
increases with g.
Given that the ine¢ ciency of common access is largest at l￿
r1 = 1, changes
in the initial resource endowment has a non-monotonic e⁄ect on the Pareto-
e¢ ciency of privatization. Common access yields a higher income than pri-
vate ownership either for relatively low or relatively high initial endowments
of the natural resource. Intuitively, when l￿
r1 is small (i.e., to the left of the
l1 and l2-curves), the resource rents under common access are large in the
￿rst period.1 Privatization of the resource then involves a signi￿cant shifting
of rents away from the traditional users. Unless the biological growth rate
is very high, this results in a loss of income. Similarly, when l￿
r1 is high (i.e.,
above the l3-curve), the rents are large in period 2, and privatization does not
lead to a Pareto-improvement. For intermediate levels of l￿
r1, however, the
rent enjoyed by traditional users under common access is small, and hence
the rent shifting e⁄ect is dominated by the bene￿ts of employment creation
on the resource. In this case, there is no trade o⁄between e¢ ciency and dis-
tribution: both arguments support privatization, which is Pareto-improving.
In sum, our analysis demonstrates that, while labor never bene￿ts from
privatization in the short term, there is a long term gain. The long term gain
is based on the observation that as long as there is a positive growth rate of
the natural resource, the period 2 employment in harvesting the resource is
bound to be higher under private ownership. The higher the growth rate, the
more likely it is that the long term employment e⁄ect dominates the short
term loss in employment and rents. Moreover, since the rent shifting e⁄ect is
minimized when the natural resource is ￿moderately￿abundant, this is also
the case when the private solution is most likely to bene￿t labor.
1Note that the reason why l1 reaches a maximum with respect to g around l￿
r1 = 1
2 is
due to the fact the resource rent under common access is maximized for this level of initial
resource endowment. Privatization would in this case lead to a substantial rent transfer,
which explains why the growth needed to make labor better o⁄ is maximized at this level
of initial endowment (in the range of l￿
r1 and g for which l1 is the relevant cut o⁄function).
103.3 Discussion
We have assumed so far that the private owners of the resource are price-
takers. Actually, privatization of natural resources has often consisted in
transferring property rights to a single owner, typically a state company. This
may lead to a dominant position on the local labor market, which may a⁄ect
employment negatively. It is therefore important to discuss the consequences
of privatization when the private owner is a monopsonist in the labor market.
As a wage setter, the monopsonist understands that w1 = lr1 and w2 = lr2.
Modifying the pro￿t function (8), we then have:
￿
m = (1 ￿ lr1)lr1 + (1 ￿ lr2)lr2: (18)
Clearly, the unconstrained choice of the monopsonist is to choose lr1 =
lr2 = 1
2 ￿ lm
r . This implies that, when the resource is abundant (for l￿
r1 > 1),
the monopsonistic owner does not necessarily exhaust all the resources in
period 2. Moreover, there is not necessarily growth in the extraction of the
natural resource over time. As a consequence, for l￿
r1 > 1, total employment
on the resource and labor incomes are always larger under common access
than under monopsony. In contrast, when the resource is scarce, the monop-
sonist optimally expands extraction over time (as is the case with atomistic
private owners). Employment thus grows, and total employment is larger
than under open access. We therefore have:
Proposition 3 Total employment in the resource extracting sector is smaller
under private monopsony ownership than under common access if and only
if l￿
r1 > 1.
Proof. We de￿ne lm
0 as the minimum level of resource endowment which
allows the monopsonist to choose lr1 = lr2 = 1





















0 the natural resource constraint is binding. Using the fact that
lr2 = (l￿
r1 ￿ lr1)(1 + g) in (18) and maximizing with respect to lr1, the equi-

















r1 > 1, employment under common access is larger than under monop-
sony. For lm
0 < l￿




employment under common access is equal to l￿
r1 in period 1 and 0 in period
2. Hence, in this case, total employment is higher under monopsony. Fi-
nally, for l￿
r1 < lm






r1)(1 + g), with lm
r1 de￿ned in (20). It is trivial to show that
for g > 0, monopsonist employment is strictly higher than common access
employment in this case too. Hence, monopsony employment is higher for
l￿
r1 < 1, while common access employment is higher for l￿
r1 > 1.
Another important assumption made in this paper is that workers in the
resource extracting sector are fully productive, in the sense that their mar-
ginal productivity does not fall below that in their alternative occupation.
This assumption allowed us to focus exclusively on the dynamic external-
ity involved in the preservation of the resource. This assumption adequately
characterizes the case where visible resources are harvested, such as logging
in a forest. It also depicts situations under which the rents from the resource
are shared among all workers. In other instances, however, rent sharing oc-
curs through employment sharing, where income from the resource is shared
exclusively by the users of the resource. Potential users compare the average
return of their labor on the resource to the wage rate. As a result, the re-
source tends to be overcrowded and rents are dissipated. Two e⁄ects are at
work here. On the one hand, in comparison to the common access situation
analyzed above, employment on the resource is larger, and returns to labor
are larger. On the other hand, rents are dissipated. Privatization does not
necessarily lead to higher total employment in the resource extracting sector.
What remains true, however, is the following:
Proposition 4 Second period employment in the resource extracting sector
is larger under private property than under employment sharing common
access.
Proof. With relative scarcity of the resource, l￿
r1 < 1, the above ob-
servation is trivially true, since with common access the resource is fully
extracted in the ￿rst period, leaving no basis for employment in this sec-
tor in the second period. With relative abundance of the resource, l￿
r1 ￿ 1,
second period employment in the resource extracting sector can be found
by equating the average product in that sector with the marginal prod-
uct in the alternative activity, i..e, APr2 = MPu2, which can be stated as
12(l￿
r1￿1)(1+g)




r1 ￿ 1)(1 + g). This second period employ-
ment level should be compared with that under private property, which from
(??), given l￿










r1 < l4 ) ls
r2 < lr2, where l4 is de￿ned in (12). Hence, as long as
there is scarcity of the resource, which we assume is the case, second period
employment is necessarily higher under private property than employment
sharing common acccess.
Hence, privatization leads to a long term gain for labor, even when the
traditional institution is characterized by employment sharing. We can there-
fore conclude that the basic message of our paper, namely that of a long-term
gain to labor from privatization, holds true also in this version of the model.
Finally, we have considered in this paper a two period model. This choice
was made for simplicity, and in the appendix, we provide an in￿nite horizon
version of the model, in which corresponding results can be derived. Inter-
estingly, private owners always preserve some of the resource and thereby
provide positive employment in all periods. It follows that there always ex-
ists a positive discount rate below which private property Pareto-dominates
common property. Relatedly, we also ignored the role played by discount fac-
tors to evaluate the e⁄ects on wages and incomes. (The generalized version of
the model developed in the appendix explicitly incorporates a discount rate.)
The e⁄ects of discouting are as expected: larger discount rates lead to less
preservation of the resource under private property, thereby reducing future
employment gains for the workers. The current values of those gains are also
discounted more heavily so that the discounted welfare of the workers under
private property is also lower.
4 Concluding remarks
The privatization of natural resources typically restricts access to resources
that traditionally have been freely available to local communities. While
there are strong e¢ ciency arguments in favor of restricting access and enforc-
ing clearly de￿ned property rights, there are some disturbing distributional
e⁄ects of this reform. In particular, it has been shown theoretically that,
without compensation, labor will necessarily lose. In our paper we focus on
renewable resources, and consider the role played by the growth rate of the
resource for the distributive impact of privatization. We demonstrate that,
13while the conservation measures undertaken to maximize pro￿ts lead to a
short run reduction in employment, they necessarily translate into higher
employment in the future. With the growth of the resource, the long run ef-
fect dominates, leading to a net increase in the total demand for labor. As a
result, even if traditional users are denied property rights and all the rents are
captured by an outsider, they will enjoy an increase in their labor incomes.
This increase may be large enough for privatization to be Pareto-improving,
even in the absence of redistribution.
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5 Appendix: an in￿nite horizon extension
In an in￿nite horizon framework, pro￿t maximization implies:
1 ￿ wt = ￿ (1 + g)(1 ￿ wt+1) (21)
where ￿ represents the discount factor and t the time period. As in the two
period model, the technology in the city is such that wt = MPut = 1 ￿ lut =
lrt, so that equation (21) can be rewritten as:
1 ￿ lrt = ￿ (1 + g)(1 ￿ lrt+1) (22)
which can be expressed as:
lrt+1 = 1 + b
t(lr1 ￿ 1) (23)
where b = 1
￿(1+g):
In this appendix, we shall focus on the case where l￿
r1 ￿ 1, so that the
resource can possibly be exhausted during the ￿rst period. The extension
to large endowments in the resource follow easily at the cost of notational





rt+1 = (1 + g)(l
￿
rt ￿ lrt) (24)











15Using equation (23), and using the fact that
t X
￿=1













(1 + g) ￿ (1 + g)1￿t

















In the limit, the transversality condition implies that the resource should be
exhausted, that is: limt!1l￿
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￿1 + ￿ (1 + g)
2










which describes the optimal extraction path in the ￿rst period.
Looking to welfare, the discounted utility of a worker under the privatized
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r1 (1 ￿ l
￿
r1): (31)
The welfare impact of privatization can then directly be obtained by com-
paring UP and UC given in the last two expressions. Again, one can easily
see that UP > UC if l￿
r1 is close to one, the growth rate of the resource is
large or the discount factor is close to one. It is also easy to show that total
employment over all periods goes up with privatization, and if the discount
rate is low enough (￿(1 + g) > 1), the discounted value of the wage rates
exceeds that under the commons.
16